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1. Thomas Hurka has never quite gained the recognition he deserves.  Of course, he is 
Chancellor Henry N.R. Jackson Distinguished Professor of Philosophical Studies at the 
University of Toronto and his CV contains a long list of articles published in the best 
philosophical journals and a number of books by the most prestigious academic presses.  And 
yet, his work has never been at the centre of the most intensive debates in moral philosophy.  
I hope that the publication of the three excellent books reviewed here play their part in 
changing this unfortunate state of affairs. 
On surface, these three books seem very different from one another. Drawing Morals 
is a collection of fifteen previously published articles by Hurka.  These essays cover a wide 
range of topics in moral philosophy from population ethics to more abstract value theory, the 
notion of desert, capital punishment, nationalism, and just war theory. Underivative Duty is, 
in contrast, a collection of articles edited by Hurka. Its articles have been written by a close 
circle of leading moral philosophers who are united by their interest in English moral 
philosophy written between 1870 and 1950s.  Finally, The Best Things in Life is a wonderful 
short book written for the general audience.  This easily accessible book explores the many 
things that are good for us. 
 Despite appearances, Hurka’s work in these books is highly systematic.  The unified 
theme of his work is best explained in the article ‘Normative Ethics: Back to the Future’, 
which opens the Drawing Morals collection.  Hurka begins this essay by openly declaring his 
love of the moral philosophers who worked in England in the late 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 
Century. This group of brilliant philosophers included Sidgwick, Moore, Rashdall, 
McTaggart, Ross, Pritchard, Broad, Ewing, and many others.  
 Even if they disagreed about many things, the majority of these philosophers shared a 
view about the fundamental nature of morality. Their basic metaethical conviction was there 
are objective ethical truths and that these sui generis truths cannot be derived from the truths 
about any other subject matter. This led many of the British Intuitionists to attempt to 
formulate a small number of more general ethical principles which would cohere with our 
intuitive ethical judgments about individual cases. Thus, on this picture, all moralizing is 
done within the autonomous ethical realm. Its purpose is to make explicit the ethical 
understanding contained in our shared moral sensibility. 
 Since 1950s, this view of moral philosophy has been viciously attacked from many 
directions.  Moral error theorists have claimed that there are no ethical truths at all; 
contemporary naturalists have argued that ethical truths just are a type of natural truths; 
constructivists have tried to generate the moral truths by using procedures offer an 
Archimedean point of view; and particularists have attempted to show that our moral 
intuitions cannot be captured by a finite number of general moral principles.  Given this 
barrage of objections, it is no wonder that the views of the Hurka’s heroes fell out of fashion 
during the second half of the 20
th
 Century. 
 In this context, non-naturalist realists have two ways of reacting to the previous set of 
challenges. The reactive response would be to explain in detail case by case what is wrong 
with error theory, naturalism, constructivism and particularism.  The problem with this route 
is that it will lead to very little new ethical understanding.  I am happy to report that this has 
never been Hurka’s approach.   
Instead, Hurka he has been defending the basic theoretical framework of the British 
Intuitionists in a much more constructive way.  Much of his work can be read as an attempt to 
specify what new moral understanding can be achieved within that framework.  This way of 
defending a certain way of doing moral philosophy contains an insight that has often been 
overlooked in moral philosophy. Views in both metaethics and normative ethics should also 
be evaluated by how fruitful they are in ethics more broadly. If certain otherwise 
controversial theoretical assumptions lead to a general research project that can shed light on 
many different ethical problems, then this must count as one reason for accepting those 
assumptions.  
 
2. As mentioned earlier, Drawing Morals contains fifteen articles by Hurka. These articles 
cover a large number of central topics in moral philosophy. They have been previously 
published in some of the most prestigious philosophical journals including The Journal of 
Philosophy, Ethics, Noûs, and Philosophy and Public Affairs. All these essays are admirably 
clearly written. They also often provide illuminating historical background for many 
contemporary ethical debates.  Furthermore, they are consistently thorough in their 
argumentation, often original and in some places even entertaining.  For reasons of space, I 
can discuss briefly here only three of these essays. 
  “The Value and Population Size” is an important early contribution to the so-called 
population ethics. Almost everyone agrees that human wellbeing is important.  And, given 
that human wellbeing is important, we all prefer to have as much of it as possible. This line of 
thought quickly leads to well known paradoxes. If we maximise the total amount of 
wellbeing, we end up creating a huge number of not very well off people. If we try to 
maximise the average amount of wellbeing instead, we will only need few people with a high 
level of wellbeing.  
 In order to avoid these paradoxes, Hurka suggested in 1983 that the value of human 
wellbeing varies depending on how many people exist.  In small populations, additional 
wellbeing has more value and so more individuals should be created.  In large populations in 
contrast, adding more wellbeing no longer makes the state of affairs better and so no new 
individuals are required.  It is evident how Hurka here follows his own methodological 
guidelines. The value of wellbeing in different contexts is here assessed on the basis of our 
moral intuitions about population sizes. All theorizing is done within the ethical perspective. 
 Of course, Hurka’s article was not the final word in the population ethics. It was soon 
shown that Hurka’s variable rate view on its own leads to other paradoxical consequences. 
However, this objection was pre-empted by Hurka in the original essay. He openly admits 
that any single ethical principle is unlikely to capture all our population-intuitions on its own. 
Even if this were correct, more work would still be needed to show that a small non-
paradoxical set of moral principles could be constructed by using Hurka’s method. 
 Perhaps the most original and interesting part of Hurka’s work has been his theory of 
virtues and their value. Much of the current literature on virtue ethics accepts the following 
three dogmas: (i) virtues are stable character-traits that are conducive to human flourishing, 
(ii) we can only make sense of virtuous acts and attitudes in terms of the virtuous character-
traits, and (iii) virtues are the greatest good.  
 In ‘How Great a Good Is Virtue?’ and ‘Virtuous Act, Virtuous Disposition’, Hurka 
attempts to challenges these widely accepted theses.  On his view, virtuous attitudes are the 
basic starting-point. They can be defined as those attitudes to goods and evils which are 
intrinsically good. Here intrinsically good attitudes consist of loving good things and hating 
bad ones in proportion to their value/disvalue. So, a motive to do an act is courageous if it 
strikes the right balance between wanting to pursue a good outcome (loving the good) and 
wanting to be safe from harm (hating the bad).  
 By using this account of virtuous motives, Hurka can do two things. Firstly, the view 
can be used to understand virtuous character-traits in a novel way. They just are dispositions 
to have virtuous motives.  Secondly, this view can be used to undermine the idea that virtue is 
the greatest good. This conclusion follows from the highly plausible principle according to 
which a loving attitude towards something that is good cannot have more value than the 
object of the attitude.  If this principle were not true, then, for example, a teacher’s desire for 
her student to acquire a certain piece of knowledge could have more value than fact that the 
student comes to acquire it. If we want to avoid this awkward conclusion, then we better 
think that the objects of virtuous attitudes are more important than the virtuous attitudes 
themselves.  
 Given how thoroughly Hurka argues for these unusual views about virtues here and in 
his other works, his perfectionist theory of virtues would certainly deserve to be discussed 
more in virtue ethics. Likewise, Hurka’s essays on value theory, autonomy, desert, capital 
punishment, nationalism, and just war collected here deserve to be studied more closely.  
 
3. In 2008, Hurka organised a conference on British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to 
Ewing at the University of Toronto. Most of the articles collected in the Underivative Duty 
were first presented at that conference. These articles are from ten philosophers who are both 
leading experts on this period of the history of moral philosophy and also leading 
contemporary ethicists. 
 In the first introductory article of the collection, Hurka explains the basic interests and 
views that were shared by the philosophers who are the focus of the collection. These 
philosophers are Hurka’s heroes already mentioned above: Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, Ross, 
Ewing, and several others working in England between 1870 and 1950s. Metaphysically, 
these philosophers were often non-naturalist realists. In normative ethics, many of them 
believed that there is a set of basic and distinct moral values and duties. They were also often 
interested in the conceptual relations between different ethical, normative, and evaluative 
concepts.  
 One nice thing about this collection of articles is that many of its essays discuss in 
illuminating detail both the views of the less well-known moral philosophers of the period 
and the less often discussed views and arguments of the house-hold names. In terms of 
historical scholarship, all these essays are first class. 
  By and large, the essays of the collection fall into two categories. Some of the 
contributors have chosen a more historical route. They are motivated by the question, what 
did X really think? Roger Crisp’s investigation of Henry Sidgwick’s views of pleasure, 
Dennis McKerlie’s discussion of McTaggart’s claims about love and its value, and T.H. 
Irwin’s article on the Intuitionists’ interpretations of Aristotle belong to this category.  
In contrast, many other contributions of the volume approach the historical figures of 
the collection through the lenses of the contemporary moral philosophy. Here the focus is 
much more on whether the historical figures could provide additional resources for the 
contemporary debates. Robert Shaver’s discussion of deontology and agent-relative reasons 
through Ross and Carritt, Philip Stratton-Lake’s argument against derivative Prima Facie 
duties on the basis of Ross, and Olson and Timmons’ discussion of metaethical non-
naturalism through Ewing belong to this category. 
Underivative Duty is a worthwhile collection of articles. Its reader is guaranteed to 
learn more about both an important group of underappreciated moral philosophers and the 
central debates in contemporary moral philosophy.  However, the articles also show how 
difficult it is to strike a balance between historical exegesis and the contemporary debates in 
this kind of work. Some of the more historically orientated essays fail to explain what is 
original and important about the explained theories. In contrast, in some of the more original 
contributions, the thin connection to the historical figures seems redundant. Fortunately, some 
essays like Dancy’s discussion of Prichard manage to find the right balance between 
historical clarification and original theorizing. I would have also liked to have seen the work 
of this period to be subjected to a more critical analysis from a richer set of philosophical 
perspectives. 
 
4. My favourite book of the three is Hurka’s The Best Things in Life. In this book, Hurka 
shows that philosophers can write accessible and important books for the general audience if 
they want to. The way in which Hurka has used his own philosophical views and the 
historical debates in moral philosophy to write a ‘self-help’ book worth reading is exemplary.   
 The first three chapters investigate different kinds of pleasures, happiness, and their 
value. The message these chapters is that not all pleasures and pains are alike. We can be in 
pleasant moods but we also feel pleasure that things are in a certain way. Some pleasures are 
isolated incidents whereas others lead to other pleasant experiences. To some pleasures and 
pains we adjust quickly whereas other pleasures and pains retain their significance over time. 
Some pleasures can be pursued directly whereas others are spoiled by this approach. And, the 
value of pains and pleasures too depend on the context. Moving from an intense pain to a 
slightly less intense pain is always important, whereas if are you already living a pleasant life 
experiencing more pleasures might not be that significant. 
 Chapter 4 explores the value of knowledge.  Hurka highlights the importance of 
understanding – of knowing general truths that can be used to explain the connections 
between a large number of more local truths. However, he also emphasises that such 
knowledge is not enough. We also need to be connected to the world by knowing our own 
particular place in it. Chapter 5 then uses the example of knowledge to construct an 
analogical view of achievements and their importance. On this view, activities that allow you 
to construct and fulfil structured and complex goals are more worthwhile than other pursuits.  
 Chapter 6 explains Hurka’s theory of virtue already mentioned above in a clear and 
accessible way. However, the books real highlight is its 7
th
 chapter on love and relationships. 
On Hurka’s view, love is important because it allows us to enjoy all other goods. Love makes 
us feel good, it allows us to know others as persons, and it helps us to achieve complex goals 
together. Love is also a way of loving good things such as the happiness of others, and thus it 
is virtuous. This chapter also explores the often superficial features that attract us to love 
others and the unique historical qualities that make us continue to love our partners. It even 
contains a helpful section on when it is time to call it quits. Not only is this chapter 
philosophical interesting but it also expresses real wisdom.  
 Finally, the last chapter of this book considers how we should attempt to combine 
different values in order to live a well-rounded good life. Of course, this book will not give 
anyone a recipe to live a good life, but it will give everyone many useful tools for thinking 
about their lives. I can only hope that this book will be read by many of those who often 
vocally claim that academic philosophers are too far removed from the most important 
practical questions. 
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